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How the Conception of Knowledge Influences Our Educational 
Practices: Toward a Philosophical Understanding of Epistemology in 
Education 
 
 
 
 
Introduction:  
 
This essay is written for practitioners and educational professionals wanting to become 
more familiar with technical philosophical issues in education, specifically, the issue of 
epistemology, or knowledge theory, as it relates to forms of learning, pedagogy, and 
assessment in the curriculum. There exists a gap between educational theorists and 
educators, which is traced by McCutcheon (1984) to the dense and overly technical 
language that academics often employ when communicating their philosophical ideas, 
“writing in jargon that renders the work inaccessible to practitioners” (p. 46).  Herein, I 
distill the essence of the philosophical issues I am dealing with and present them in a way 
that is both accessible and understandable without sacrificing their depth or weight. 
Philosophy, after all, if it is of any importance, must be, in addition to logical and well-
reasoned speech, communicable. For it is only through communication, as the “aim of 
philosophy,” that its “other aims are ultimately rooted: awareness of being, illumination 
through love, attainment of peace” (Jaspers, 1954, p. 27). Bringing systematic philosophy 
and a formal methodology to bear on the problems of education represents an instance 
where philosophy contributes in a direct and positive manner to the active and ongoing 
processes of current educational reform.  
 The goals and aims of education determine the planning, writing, and 
implementation of the curriculum. The manner in which we conceive knowledge, along 
with the valuation of certain forms of knowledge, relate directly to our conception of 
education along with the understanding of the student’s potential for intellectual, 
emotional, and social development. In this paper, I analyze the relationship between our 
fundamental epistemological beliefs, pedagogy, and the modes for assessing student 
learning within the curriculum. To this end, two fundamental epistemological beliefs 
concerning knowledge forms as they manifest in the instruction of will be examined. In 
the first section, I provide a general introduction to epistemology and its relation to 
education. In the second section, I demonstrate the unique way in which knowledge 
manifests in the curriculum through the analysis of two reading theories and their 
respective notions of pedagogy and learning. In the final section, touchstone theory is 
explored in relation to validating competing theories of education, i.e., I explore the 
manner in which the reading theories presented in the previous sections of the paper 
might be philosophically analyzed for their epistemological validity. 
 
 
Epistemology and Education:  
 
Epistemology is a branch of philosophy concerned with the origin, reliability, and 
criterion of knowledge. Philosophy, concerned with the reliability and justification of 
knowledge, asks the following interrelated questions: By what means have we acquired 
knowledge? What is the scope and dimension of our knowledge? How can we trust the 
reliability of our truth-claims? It is important to understand how we obtain truth along 
with the manner in which we judge and determine the ‘truth-value’ of our propositions 
and other expressions of knowledge. It is crucial that our claims to knowledge are 
resistant to the ultimate challenge of skepticism. This is also the case with our 
educational practices and the fundamental knowledge forms around which we structure 
the curriculum. The systematic and philosophical understanding of knowledge and 
epistemology is “especially relevant when we raise the question of how to justify a 
particular conception of education, or program of education” (Walker & Evers, 1982, p. 
213).   
According to the ancient Greeks, the ways in which we know that world are many 
and varied. For example, Aristotle points out in the Nicomachean Ethics that we know 
things by means of wisdom (sophia), scientific knowledge (episteme), practical insight 
(phronesis), perceptual intuition (aisthesis), and technical ‘know-how’ (techne). Indeed, 
the complete life for Aristotle includes the crucial understanding of how to organize these 
various legitimate forms of knowledge into a working whole that represents the complete 
life of ‘human flourishing’ (eudaimonia). Each unique form of knowledge that Aristotle 
outlines has its appropriate function and purpose, and importantly, these various forms of 
knowledge are experienced, understood, organized, transmitted, and instilled through the 
processes of education. Contemporary philosophers have a similar view of knowledge 
and its varying forms, and it is possible to understand the types of knowledge, and their 
concomitant modes of reasoning, manifesting in the curriculum according to the 
following epistemological divisions: (1) Analytic knowledge, which is truth by definition, 
e.g., rudimentary mathematical equations and grammatical tautologies; (2) Synthetic 
knowledge, which synthesizes many ideas, e.g., the propositions of the empirical sciences 
(logical-analytic); (3) Normative understanding, which represents value judgments, and, 
a closely related form of knowledge; (4) Aesthetic intuition, which is a form of 
perceptual insight associated with the arts and humanities (intuitive-perceptual).1  
The central aims of education define the curriculum, which includes approaches 
to pedagogy that best serve these aims and objectives. There is a complex relationship 
between the establishment of educational aims and goals and their enactment in the 
practical activities of the classroom. The relationship between aims, goals, and the 
respective view of education concerns such issues as the philosophy of learning, the 
definition of competency, the interpersonal relationship between teacher and student, and 
ultimately, a conception of personhood, or the issue of human identity. There is a 
fundamental epistemological issue underlying this web of relations: the form of 
knowledge that education embraces and values grounds the entire curriculum and 
determines the way in which education is understood and unfolds. For example, if we 
take the issue of human identity as related to specific forms of knowledge, we see that the 
                                                 
1  Philosopher David Best clearly elucidates the revelatory encounter with art in the curriculum, 
specifically literature, in terms of a noetic experience, or experience of knowledge. In line with 
the cognitive view of the arts, Best argues for the link between the emotions that art inspires and 
cognition, understanding, and reason. He refers to the form of perceptual knowledge that art 
facilitates as “emotional rationality.” Best, David (1989). “Feeling and reason in the arts: The 
rationality of feeling,” in The symbolic order, (ed.) Peter Abbs, Falmer Press: Philadelphia. 
way in which knowledge is conceived reflects directly our conception of human essence 
and the subsequent modes of education that are best suited for facilitating human 
development. A brief examination of rationalism, the philosophical view that 
foundational knowledge is discovered through self-evident insight by means of the power 
of pure reason, and empiricism, the view that experience is the inroad to all knowledge, 
will illustrate this point.2 
If we adopt the view that knowledge emerges through self-evident insight 
(rationalism), as we find in the philosophy of Descartes, we understand the human being 
in terms of a ‘thing that thinks’ (res cogitans), i.e., the human has an indelible and 
immutable essence located in its capacity and capability to use its mind. This view of the 
human is found in essentialist models of education (e.g., the educational philosophy of 
Mortimer Adler), and the aims and goals of education are consistent with the 
understanding of the human. Teaching in this model for education is directed toward the 
development of reason because it is our essential human nature. If, on the other hand, we 
adopt the view that knowledge emerges through experience (empiricism), as we find in 
the philosophy of Locke, we understand the human being in terms of a blank slate upon 
which experience writes. Here, as opposed to an essence that is given in advance (essence 
precedes existence), our essence, as it were, is something that develops. In this view, our 
personal identity is constructed throughout our life as we engage in the activity of 
experiential problem solving (existence precedes essence). This view of the human being 
is found in instrumentalist models of education (e.g., the educational philosophy of John 
Dewey), and the aims and goals of education is these models are “based on experience – 
which is always actual life-experience of some individual” (Dewey, 1963, p. 89).   
Pedagogy is designed to best facilitate the student’s accomplishing the goals that 
determine the direction her education will take, and this includes instructional methods 
along with appropriate and reliable means for assessing and evaluating the student’s 
work. As related to the philosophy of knowledge, Moore (1979) confirms that our 
educational practices, the modes and methods of instruction for taking our students 
through a variety of specific, goal-oriented activities, are grounded in epistemological 
concerns. “Differences in conviction about the nature of knowledge, that knowledge is 
basically mathematical in character, or basically scientific, or religious will result in 
different theories, with different emphasis on methods related to practice” (p. 12). In 
order to investigate how the conception of knowledge determines pedagogical methods 
and modes of assessment that are consistent with the knowledge source, I move to 
examine: (1) Knowledge from the essentialist cluster, which is a traditional and 
conservative view of knowledge that adopts the ‘objective’ view of truth and the Either-
Or philosophy of knowledge, and (2) Knowledge from the instrumentalist cluster, which 
                                                 
2 Throughout this essay, I employ essentialism and instrumentalism as epistemological terms 
referencing two distinct forms of knowledge: (1) essentialism, which relates to the belief that 
things have essences, and an explanation or definition, if it is accurate and true, will capture this 
essence in knowledge; and (2) instrumentalism, which relates to the belief that ideas are correct 
when they create possibilities for efficacious and beneficial actions that satisfy our needs and 
purposes. In this latter view, the notion of truth and falsity, as we find in traditional epistemology 
is not so much an issue. Rather, instrumentalism is concerned with positions (or perspectives on 
the world) that are more ‘useful,’ and hence, more ‘correct,’ than others in facilitating the 
accomplishment of our goals.  
adopts a ‘pragmatic’ view of knowledge and the Both-And philosophy of knowledge. In 
this view, knowledge occurs between the interaction of the student and her environment, 
as it is grounded in the student’s unique experiences and holds a legitimate practical 
value in both the life of the student and her community.  
 
Essentialist Approaches to Reading 
 
Philosophical and educational essentialism first appears in Plato’s Republic and a close 
reading of the Allegory of the Cave reveals Plato’s entire philosophy of education 
(paideia), which expresses the infamous distinction between transient realm of the senses 
and the immutable, eternal realm of the forms (eidai). Plato’s understanding of the world 
and the human is explained through Grand-Narrative, and this explanation serves to 
ground the curriculum for educating the ideal Athenian state, which produces a “ruling 
class” of philosopher-kings who “govern in the light of ultimate truths revealed by 
reason” (Bonnett, 2001, p. 29). Not only does Plato’s philosophy explain the essence of 
truth (the objective form of the Good), it also provides the legitimate epistemological 
means by which to access it. For Plato, truth is transcendent and objective; so he 
advocates abstract, contemplative philosophical thought (theoria) above methods of 
inquiry that are based on the ‘subjective’ senses or rooted in experience. The movement 
of Plato’s thought through the history of philosophy and education (as Platonism), 
graduating as it does through essentialism and idealism, it eventually finds its way into 
the contemporary ideological view of curriculum-education known as the Scholar-
Academic model. 
 Practitioners are perhaps more familiar with this view of education as it relates to 
the  essentialism of Adler and his Paideia Proposal, which stresses the same curriculum 
for all students and treats them as essentially minds or intellects to be developed through 
the immersion in and transmission of perennial and canonical works of high cultural 
significance. Adler’s essential curriculum model is grounded in the notion that student’s 
cannot be great, or even considered educated, until they read the great books, acquire a 
command of grammar and rhetoric, and demonstrate a higher understanding of 
mathematics and logic. All these courses of study are intended to develop the power of 
the student’s mind, and studies are organized sequentially and systematically in order to 
maximize the various stages of the student’s cognitive development. The curriculum is 
transferred through three methods of pedagogy, all of which emerge from a didactic 
model of instruction. Although Adler refers to the methods of “coaching” and 
“supervised practice,” along with “maieutic or Socratic questioning,” these various 
approaches to teaching are not concerned with ‘knowledge construction’ through 
discussion, or critical dialogue.3 Rather, these methods work to broaden and deepen the 
things initially learned through methods of didactic instruction (Adler, 1982). 
                                                 
3 In his analysis of Socratic teaching, which resembles a process of meaning-making through 
discourse, Rud (1997) claims that although Adler advances a three-pronged approach to 
pedagogy, the so-called “Socratic Method” he advocates in the later stages of education depends 
exclusively on the information transferred in the first stage of learning to the student, which is 
highlighted by knowledge acquisition through lectures and techniques of memorization. Rud, 
Anthony, G. (1997) The use and abuse of Socrates in present day teaching, Education Policy. 5 
(20).   
 Since it is the case that when we determine what knowledge is and why it should 
be valued, we structure our educational practices around these beliefs, we must ask the 
following interrelated questions: Who are the authorities making decisions regarding the 
curriculum content? Who is in possession of the privileged knowledge that is taught to 
students? There is a problem associated with the essentialist conception knowledge 
relating to the privileged status of those deciding on the content of the curriculum. For 
example, in the scholar academic model of education, Hirsch (1998) advocates the notion 
of cultural literacy, arguing that students should become familiar with certain works of 
high culture that “reproduce the shared cultural structures that underlie literate 
communications of the present day” (pp. 135-136). Hirsch, along with several other 
intellectuals from the Western canon of the sciences and the humanities, goes on to 
compile a list of essential names, dates, and events throughout history, which are deemed 
important to all students, despite their race, culture, or social class status. In this age of 
multiculturalism and marked economic displacement, we should be skeptical, and further, 
highly critical of educational practices that reproduce the reigning ideology within our 
classrooms in terms of outdated conservative ideals, as a form of authoritarian and elitist 
cultural imposition. In relation to this issue of cultural elitism, is the issue of cultural 
exclusion, and Young (2008) addresses this when writing of knowledge of the powerful, 
“defined by who gets the knowledge in a society,” and powerful knowledge, defined in 
terms of  the superior “intellectual power it gives those who have access to it” (p. 14). 
This indicates the unique problems that arise when access to the knowledge that is most 
‘useful’ in a society is denied to certain segments of the population.   
 When Cunningham & Fitzgerald (1996) elucidate the formal conceptions of 
knowledge in the curriculum, along with the epistemological cluster under which the 
various types of knowledge are subsumed, they argue that essentialism holds the 
following beliefs with respect to knowledge in the curriculum: (1) Knowledge exists at an 
objective remove from the knowing subject; (2) Those who possess knowledge and deem 
it valuable select it for inclusion in the curriculum; and (3) Knowledge can be taught, or 
transmitted, effectively to the mind of the knowing subject (pp. 44-45). Stated 
philosophically, in the curriculum embracing an essentialist view of knowledge and 
approach to reading instruction, when the student grasps the text’s objective meaning, he 
or she is said to have knowledge. As stated, essentialism employs the Correspondence 
Model of Truth when validating truth-claims, which works off the logic that an idea is 
true, if and only if, there is a correspondence between the thinking subject and the 
objective state-of-affairs. In this epistemological view, the locus of truth resides in the 
valid locution or proposition (either spoken or written), and the essence of truth is the 
agreement between knower and known, between idea as representation and reality 
(Heidegger, 1967). 
 Cunningham and Fitzgerald (1996) outline a theoretical model for reading 
instruction grounded in the essentialist epistemological cluster. It is possible through 
analysis to demonstrate how pedagogy and assessment emerge in the reading or language 
arts curriculum when these practices are based on an objective notion of truth with its 
concomitant model for verification. The authors begin by presenting an analysis of a 
reading model based on the research of Rumelhart, and detail the manner in which the 
conception of knowledge actively influences both reading instruction and the forms of 
assessment consistent with essentialist philosophy. Thus, in approaching Rumelhart’s 
theoretical model for reading in a philosophical manner, we should be asking the 
following questions: Where is knowledge, or meaning, located? Is it situated in the text or 
the reader? How does knowledge obtain? What is the criterion for truth in this theoretical 
model? Addressing these questions will reveal the knowledge source and related criterion 
for verification. It must be noted that the manner in which we determine the validity of 
our knowledge must be consistent with the view of knowledge we are adopting. 
 Rumelhart’s theoretical reading model can be understood in terms of a dualistic 
approach to knowledge in the curriculum, which embraces the notion of the ‘subject-
object’ divide. This clearly indicates where knowledge, or meaning, is located in the 
process of reading: In Rumelhart’s interactional model, the “reader and text are separate, 
and meaning occurs between the two, as they interact” (Cunningham & Fitzgerald, 1996, 
p. 52). Initially, the authors state that in this view meaning is both discovered and created. 
However, after a critical assessment of Rumelhart’s findings, aside from the slight 
cognitive-linguistic variations that arise in the reading process, e.g., the manner in which 
readers vary with respect to non-sensory knowledge, the correctness of language, the 
efficacy of assessing signs and symbols, and other elements of Rumelhart’s information 
processing model, the process is ultimately reducible to the ‘discovery’ of meaning, and 
the final word on knowledge in this model rests with the text along with the educator’s 
understanding of it. For in this model embracing both metaphysical and epistemological 
dualism, the meaning of the text is situated at an objective remove form the reader; it is 
objective knowledge that stands beyond the thinking subject. 
This form of essentialist knowledge associated with this model for reading 
instruction is also classified as pre-procedural, i.e., “knowledge simply exists and there is 
no need to construct it” (Brownlee, Boulton-Lewis, & Berthelson, 2008, p. 459). Within 
the essentialist curriculum the preferred method of instruction is didactic to insure that 
truth is directly and effectively transferred to students who are viewed as passive, empty 
vessels requiring content, waiting and needing to be filled with knowledge that is in the 
possession of authorities. When considering the notion of objective truth grounding the 
educational paradigm, Katz (2000) concludes, “When what is known is tantamount to a 
found knowledge object accessible only to authorities, teaching becomes an excursion in 
telling (or showing), and learning an exercise in remembering” (p. 137). Freire (2009) 
views this form of education, which he terms the “banking concept” of teaching, as 
exploitive. “In the banking concept of education knowledge is a gift bestowed by those 
who consider themselves knowledgeable upon those whom they consider to know 
nothing” (p. 72). This model for teaching is oppressive because educators project 
ignorance and a sense of inferiority on those who are subjugated, manipulated, and 
domesticated under the yoke of a conservative ideology that insidiously shapes and drives 
the processes of education. In addition to setting up a hierarchical, asymmetrical power 
balance between teachers (as authorities)  and students  (as subordinates), it is also 
problematic “because of the social-psychological knowledge of human beings volition 
and proactivism” (Brosio, 2000, p. 70). Essentialist models for education ignore the 
temporal-historical aspects of learning and the potential for change and becoming within 
the curriculum, and as a result, hypostatize the present, or praxis, which leads to a 
fatalistic position that is resistant to historical change and the potential for authentic 
social reform (Pinar, 1994).  
 Since the essentialist curriculum is structured around a set of predetermined 
standards for competency, the chosen method of didactic instruction excludes self-
directed or cooperative learning as knowledge construction, or meaning-making, which 
precludes the inclusion of the emotional and intellectual biography of the student in the 
learning process. As a result, little or no sense of ownership, or ‘personalization,’ of 
knowledge occurs. According to Balleck (1964), within the essentialist view of 
education, there is a relationship of identity between the ends and goals of the curriculum 
and the student’s preconceived needs, which ultimately determine the “way in which 
knowledge should be organized and taught to meet these ends and needs” (p. 263). 
Assessment in this model is reduced to a process of measuring, gauging, and judging, 
“the closeness of the fit between what is told (or shown) and what is remembered, be it 
through a formal test or classroom discourse structure” (Katz, 2000, p. 139). Teachers 
have the answers in advance and know exactly what they are looking for. Thus, it is 
common to find a grading tool for evaluation and assessment based on the traditional “A 
through F” system. In this view of education, the “traditional report card along with 
failing grades – is justified because it is linked to a curriculum that is in turn integrally 
part of reality,” and what is ‘real’ in the essentialist  view of knowledge refers to 
objective truth that is in the possession of professional authorities or educators (Brosio, 
2000, p. 63).   
 Education in this view is grounded in the drive to uncover the objective meaning 
of the text, which ultimately stands beyond the creative interpretive powers of the reader. 
Thus, as in all essentialist thought, there is external meaning which must be acquired by 
is taught, or given over, to the students by the teacher. Since the knowledge experience 
that occurs through the interaction between reader and text depends for its correctness on 
the author’s message, when assessing a student's comprehension of the reading material, 
it is the educator that determines whether or not the readers’ ideas about the text are 
reflective of the actual meaning of the text. Thus, by means of the Correspondence Model 
of Truth, the student’s interpretation is linked with the established, authoritative 
interpretation of the objective text. As related to the study  of literature or poetry in an 
institution of higher learning, it is the case that no critical commentary by an author 
exists, as in the case of the Greek tragedians. For example, when studying classical 
poetry, meaning or correctness is based on the canonical interpretation of one or another 
scholarly authority, which means that the educator incorporates the trusted literary views 
of established experts in the field, such as classicists or well-respected literary critics in 
the discipline of comparative literature.  
  
Instrumentalist Approaches to Reading 
 
In the history of education, it is possible to understand the instrumental view of 
knowledge, as found in progressivism and constructivist models of education, as 
emerging from the tradition of realism in education, which in turn emerges from the 
empirical philosophy of Locke, as it is interpreted and expressed in the education 
philosophy of Herbert Spencer. Although Spencer favored moral training and the 
cultivation of the intellect as overarching concerns of education, his philosophy of 
teaching, emphasizing science and psychology, shares much in common with Dewey’s 
notions of pedagogy and child-centered learning. Spencer’s view of knowledge and 
knowledge construction prefigures the understanding of knowledge as experiential, 
progressing from the concrete to the abstract, from the particular to the universal. In fact, 
it is possible to view Spencer as constructing the bridge between essentialism and 
progressivism in education, for he advocates an approach to education stressing 
experimentation and the collective problem-solving method in the classroom. Rather than 
handing over ready-made truths to the students, in the form of abstract principles, 
Spencer believes that children “should be led to make their own investigations, and to 
draw their own inferences. They should be told as little as possible and induced to 
discover as much as possible” (Spencer, 1888, pp. 124-25).   
In contrast to essentialism, instrumentalism represents the ‘philosophy of 
knowledge’ (epistemology) championed by Pierce, James, and Dewey, who are all 
associated with the philosophy of pragmatism. Although each thinker has ideas unique to 
their respective vision of pragmatism, these philosophers concur on the following 
philosophical points: (1) Pragmatism is a method for solving problems and answering 
questions without relying in the first instance on abstract principles for practical action; 
and (2) Pragmatism is a method that favors experience as the inroad to knowledge, which 
occurs between the interaction of the human and her environment through the 
implementation of a ‘scientific method.’ To reiterate an earlier point, pragmatism is a 
form of philosophy that embraces a ‘theory of knowledge’ that is instrumental in nature. 
Hence, to be an instrumentalist, one “interprets the meaning of a statement in terms of its 
practical consequences, a position is either true or false according to its results” (Pojman, 
2006, p. 258). The propositions that ground, guide, and direct our practical activities must 
demonstrate their efficacy at problem solving within real-world situations; the practical 
‘effectiveness’ of our ideas serves as the ‘gold-standard’ for determining the correctness 
of these ideas, their truth-in-usefulness, as it were.  
Truth, according to Dewey, gives us the ability to change the environment as it 
affords us with “genuine experience,” and “every genuine experience has an active side 
which changes in some degree the objective conditions under which experiences are had” 
(Dewey, 1963, p. 39). To be accurate, Dewey opts for warranted assertability when 
justifying truth-claims, which amounts to validating the hypotheses that direct our actions 
and allow us to effectively bring our activities to a close in a suitable manner. What is 
true terminates a situation in a sufficiently unified manner and allows us to envision and 
facilitate coherent activities in the future. While those who hold to the essentialist view of 
knowledge demand utter certainty to their knowledge, and further, believe they can have 
it, those adopting the instrumental view believe that knowledge is always beyond 
categorical justification, for it is malleable, always in the process of being reworked, 
always in the process of evolving by means of our attempts to continually refine our 
theories about the world based on previous experience (Dewey, 1990). Jonas and 
Nakazawa (2008), writing on the Nietzsche’s philosophy and its relationship to 
pragmatism and education, express this aforementioned view nicely in terms of a 
knowledge-system composed of tentative assertions, a collection of coherent, 
instrumentally correct perspectives that comprises the context of lived experience, 
wherein some perspectives offer superior contributions to solving our problems. 
 
Indeed, for Nietzsche there are only perspectives – but a close examination of his 
concept of perspectivism reveals that some perspectives are ‘truer’ than others. 
This does not mean that they are truer according to the traditional standard of 
better reflecting ‘absolute reality,’ but rather that they better reflect our 
perspectival reality, the reality before us every day (p. 270).4 
 
 In this view, knowledge emerges through a process of construction, or meaning-
making, where the students’ personal experiences, beliefs, desires, and needs play 
integral roles in learning. Knowledge is constructed as new information is assimilated 
within the students’ store, or archive, of existing knowledge. Knowledge is always in a 
process of becoming, it is always being reshaped and reconstructed as the students’ 
cognitive capacities change, adapt, and develop to accommodate new and unique 
experiences. As opposed to the Correspondence Model of Truth, as was introduced in the 
section on essentialism, where ideas are true if, and only if, they correspond with external 
reality, the instrumentalist view of knowledge adopts the Coherence Model of Truth, 
which focuses on the manner in which our thoughts, beliefs and opinions cohere within a 
general system of meaning. Katz (2000) expresses this notion of coherence when arguing 
that within a progressive curriculum, “people and ideas are interrelated, abilities, needs, 
interests, and learning styles of students are integral factors that shape the program” (p. 
138). However, although instrumentalist models focus on the subjective experience of the 
individual, this is not to indicate that the model for education degenerates into 
epistemological relativism.5 For there is a way to ‘objectivize’ the subjective knowledge 
of the student: knowledge in this case is inter-subjectively verified by relating potential 
knowledge or new knowledge to the “archival tradition,” and by considering beliefs in 
light of that which is taken to be “true” communally, learners  
 
form and revise their beliefs on the basis of evidence accumulated in the public 
store. In this way a bridge is built between the subjective properties of individual 
knowers (i.e., their beliefs and interpretations) and that which is generally known 
and from which learners are held accountable (Ibid, 142).  
 
In contrast to essentialism, instrumentalism leads a to a completely different set of 
assumptions regarding goals, pedagogy, and assessment. This program of education, 
which is associated with a progressivism, or child-centered model for education, in 
addition to stressing knowledge construction, highlights the social aspects of learning and 
embraces radically unique view of the teacher-pupil relationship. According to Dewey 
(1963), a curriculum should include a form of instruction that allows for a unique 
                                                 
4 It must be acknowledged that this classification of Nietzsche, as a so-called pragmatist, has its 
origins in the philosophy of Arthur Danto and is not common among Nietzsche scholars. For 
example, translator and commentator Daniel Breazeale limits his classification of Nietzsche to 
that of an epistemological instrumentalist. This position is clearly articulated in Nietzsche’s early 
essay, “On Truth and Lies in a Non-Moral Context” (1873).  
5 Epistemological relativism can be traced to the ancient Greek sophist, or ‘wise-man,’ Protagoras 
(“Man is the measure of all things: of things that are that they are, and of things that are not that 
they are not.”). This position states that our subjective claims to knowledge, which are grounded 
in subjective sense perception, can’t be verified with certainty in an objective manner: Truth 
remains relative to the individual. This position relates to both philosophical solipsism and 
subjectivism in metaphysics and epistemology.  
experience of learning to occur in the “give and take between teachers and pupils” (p. 
72). Learning for Dewey is experiential, and experience consists of ‘democratic’ social 
interaction, wherein the school facilitates the student’s capacities and capabilities 
required for a democratic life by structuring an environment where democratic principles 
are integrated within their learning activities. Dewey’s philosophy is an important 
instance of knowledge as ‘social construction,’ an idea that continues to inspire our 
educational practices, e.g, the social construction model, wherein the school is conceived 
as a “miniature community, an embryonic society,” and its aims are the “development of 
social power and insight,” which opens the possibility for a liberation from the aims of 
utility in order to expand “the possibilities of the human spirit” (Dewey, 1990, p. 18). 
Education is really concerned with the processes of rational and imaginative problem-
solving, in terms that relate directly to the understanding of the curriculum as a 
democratic social-historical context for developing the type of student who might one day 
make legitimate contributions to the society through the understanding that comes 
through communal learning. 
One important aspect of teaching within a curriculum stressing meaning-making 
over knowledge-transfer is the focus on organizing the curriculum in such a way that the 
learner is guided through activities that are initially inspired by her spontaneous interests. 
From the analysis of the student’s needs, wants, desires, and interests, in relation to the 
‘public sphere’ of knowledge, educational goals arise. For Dewey, social learning and 
knowledge construction are related directly to overcoming of the false dichotomies, or 
‘dualisms,’ of traditional essentialist education. Since all learning is practical activity for 
Dewey, the learning is always an active and dynamic process, as opposed to the 
essentialist notion of knowledge as inert, which is passed along through the method of 
knowledge-transfer. The teacher facilitates the student’s capacity for change and 
adaptation. Education inspires the student’s ability to reconstruct experience to suit her 
developing needs in the present as they might authentically relate to her future activities. 
Although Dewey’s instructional methods undoubtedly allow for spontaneity in the 
learning process, the spontaneous aspects of the learning process do not result in 
unstructured, impulsive activity on the student’s part. Dewey is clear that instruction 
always attempts to guide “intelligent activity” based on the “formation of purposes,” 
which take s into account that knowledge emerges when student are actively assimilating 
their surroundings, acutely aware of what happened previously in similar situations, and, 
consciously exercising the “judgment which puts together what is observed and what is 
recalled to see what they satisfy” (Dewey, 1963, p. 69). Since knowledge is not limited to 
discovery, and does not occur through teacher-monologue or transfer, a personalization 
of knowledge occurs. When knowledge is a matter of interpretive construction, it 
embraces the particularities and uniqueness of the student’s educational experience.  
This leads to the consideration of the instructor’s role in the instrumentalist model 
of education, which is best described as a facilitator of learning and a co-participant in the 
processes of meaning-making in the classroom. This presupposes that the educator is 
aware student’s personal intellectual and emotional makeup and sets out organizing both 
he classroom environment along with planning and organizing the activities that 
encourage the further development of their intellectual and emotional biographies. This 
notion of the teacher-pupil relationship undoubtedly stands at odds with the essentialist 
understanding of the teacher as the ‘all-knowing’ authority figure, who is in complete 
control of the classroom, as the sole possessor of ‘knowledge.’ The model for the teacher 
we encounter in Dewey is also present, as mentioned above, to contemporary models for 
curriculum. For example, we find a similar model advocated by Shore (1992) who 
stresses teaching for ‘social justice,’ wherein the classroom and activities are structured 
by the teacher in such ways to optimize the students’ freedom, facilitating a democratic 
environment for communal problem solving. Shor avoids direct instruction in the 
classroom, and instead opts a method of dialogue that empowers students, and 
encourages them, in an atmosphere of equality, “to learn more and to develop intellectual 
and affective powers to think about transforming society” (Ibid, p. 111). When learning 
unfolds as dialogue, through a problem-posing pedagogy, democratic virtues that Shor 
speaks of are instantiated within the structure and organization of the activities as 
learning transpires.  
To continue with this point, in this model, teachers do not ‘talk at’ students but 
rather talk with them, teachers do not pose questions pose questions to which they 
already have easy answers to, rather they “pose the problem for dialogue as a 
participatory opening, thus inviting students to assume authority in making the 
curriculum, “ by becoming co-participants in the proves of problem-solving” (Ibid, p. 
86). Although initiated and facilitated by the critical educator, the dialogue that transpires 
is receptive to all students contributing to the discussion, which serves as the medium 
through which the classroom is united in the pursuit of learning, in the processes of 
meaning-making. Shor views the authentic teacher-pupil dialogue as representing “the 
threads of communication that bind people together and prepare them for reflective 
action” (Ibid, p. 86). In this alternative pedagogical model for teaching, which is opposed 
to direct instruction, not only do pedagogical methods differ from the traditional 
essentialist model, but modes of assessment also assume unique forms. For example, 
formative assessment is stressed above the exclusive reliance on summative assessment, 
which takes into account the fluid nature of knowledge construction. The visions and 
intentions of learning are always open to assessment and reevaluation, and the educator in 
this model must always have an eye toward potentially changing the direction of the 
lesson in response to the student’s developing and expressed needs.  
While the following suggestions do not exhaust the possibilities of assessment 
and evaluation within a progressive model, they provide critical insight into the marked 
difference between the two philosophies of education that I am examining, and include: 
(1) systematic observation and the recording of student progress, noting the ways in 
which they adapt themselves to new situations as they acquire new knowledge; (2) 
student self-assessment, where students journal about what they have learned and what 
they would like to learn, along with the successes and difficulties they have 
encountered, including the manner in which they attempted with success or failure to 
overcome certain obstacles in their path. A sense of ownership accompanies this form of 
assessment, because it allows the student to assess her personal abilities as opposed to 
relating or comparing her achievements and progress to other students; and (3) teacher-
directed portfolio assessment, which incorporates a rubric for assessment that allows for 
the teacher and student to relate the development of the student's experience to the 
evolution of the overall depth of her interpretive abilities. Such modes of assessment 
take into consideration the reflexivity of the student and the crucial notion self-
understanding in the process of becoming a holistic learner, of developing an 
authentic sense of self-hood. 
 
 
I now turn to examine the second theoretical reading model that Cunningham 
and Fitzgerald outline, which is Rosenblatt's transactional view of reading instruction. 
Rosenblatt’s model is consistent with knowledge that is actively constructed within 
an experiential context, which is referred to as procedural knowledge, and this form of 
constructed knowledge affords the student the ability to grasp the coherency between 
ideas within a system, as well the "relationships between systems of ideas" (Brownlee, 
Boulton-Lewis, and Berthelson, 2008, p. 459). Rosenblatt's position states that 
meaning happens between the reciprocal action of reader and text, within a shared 
horizon, or context, for meaning. Rosenblatt argues for two modes of interpretation: the 
efferent and the aesthetic. The former relates to the analytic and logical aspects of 
interpretation, associated with scientific meaning, and the latter relates to the 
emotional, associative, and personal elements of reading. Just as in the progressive 
model of education presented above, Rosenblatt's theoretical model is concerned with 
the personal and subjective elements of the reader's constitution, which includes her 
knowledge store and the emotional aspects of her being. The reader, in this instance, is an 
active participant in and contributor to the process of meaning. Whereas traditional 
(essentialist) reading for comprehension proceeds in a linear fashion and presupposes 
the text's established, universal meaning, Rosenblatt understands the reading process as 
developing by means of a vertical spiral, where there is no universal meaning 
presupposed and meaning develops through hermeneutic interpretation; reading is an 
active, heuristic endeavor. 
It is possible to state that Rosenblatt conceives knowledge in terms of the 
possibilities of Both/And philosophy as opposed to the traditional Either/Or conception 
of knowledge associated with essentialism. Since interpretation cannot be measured 
against a definitive textual meaning, the educator’s task is to encourage and nurture the 
kind of creative, imaginative thinking that will allow for the possibilities of ever 
deepening interpretations on the part of the student. However, and this relates to what has 
been said abut warranted assertabilty and knowledge of an instrumental nature, although 
a definitive interpolation does not exist, it is possible by “agreeing on a criteria of 
evaluation and interpretation, there can be warranted assertions, or alternative truths with 
some more accurate than others” (Cunningham & Fitzgerald, 2996, p. 54). Although this 
store of warranted assertions is certainly not an objective store of absolute knowledge, 
we might imagine the public store of knowledge to which the student has access in terms 
of a collective system of meanings and inter-subjective agreements. According to 
Brownlee, Boulton-Lewis, & Bertheson (2008), the more students believe in “procedural 
and constructed knowledge, the more likely they are to consider that learning takes time 
and is a constructed process, which results in better performance in course work” (p. 
459). With respect to assessment, we might incorporate several of the methods as 
outlined above including portfolios and personal journals, which allow educators to 
determine whether or not the student’s interpretations are becoming more profound in 
depth, asking whether the student is growing as a human being by increasing her store of 
acquired-knowledge, working toward honing old techniques while actively incorporating 
new techniques for interpretation. 
 
 
 
Touchstone and the Validation of Educational Theory 
 
In this final section, I briefly deal with touchstone theory, which Walker and Evers bring 
to discussions on education and epistemology. This theory, or meta-theory, is originally 
derived from Imre Lakatos (1922-1974), the philosopher of mathematics and science, and 
serves as the background theory against which we determine the validity of competing 
theories. All theories share similar ‘touchstone points,’ e.g., ‘observations’ and facts that 
are relevant to their claims, and they share “theoretical machinery” for organizing their 
data: logic, mathematics, and semantics. It is the work of touchstone to reveal and clarify, 
through analysis, the sets of observations and facts, and their organization, that best 
provide a solution to the problem to which each is addressed. For the purpose of this 
essay, it is possible to incorporate touchstone theory to analyze and evaluate the 
knowledge-claims that the two theoretical reading models discussed above offer, 
determining the problems that they seek to address and forming an understanding of what 
might be counted in the first instance as touchstone. It must be noted that although 
touchstone theory is employed in the service of policing rival theories, it is not an 
instance of a superior theory, for it  “is not made up of epistemologically favored 
statements,” and it is not providing us with absolute, categorical assurances that one 
theory is superior to another (Walker & Evers, 1984, p. 220). Rather, it offers good 
reasons, with tentative proof, to support one theory over another by means of logical and 
informed arguments. Since educational theories arise out of our contextual social-
historical practices, there are no “eternally justified or necessary truths, no final 
foundations. We have to work out our epistemic positions by reference to the theoretical 
structures and using theory-laden techniques currently available to us in our concrete 
historical, practical situation” (Ibid, p. 221).6 
Herein, I have focused on the forms of instruction and assessment that were 
consistent with a reading theory based on an understanding of the curriculum’s 
foundational view of knowledge. However, if our goal were to assess in detail, for the 
purpose of adoption on a district-wide level, each of the reading theories, touchstone 
would include to the epistemological analysis the data provided by other disciplines in 
order to expand the context of the philosophical analysis. At this point we would turn to 
areas of study that are the “province of the sciences, disciplines such as child study, child 
psychology, sociology. These behavioral and social sciences provide descriptive theories 
about children, about how they grow, develop, about the effect on them of familial, 
                                                 
6 Touchstone is yet another instance of theory, and in fact, there are no formalized views of the 
world that are not theoretical in nature. The moment we describe, categorize, and organize our 
observations, we are producing theory-laden views, or perspectives, on the world (Lakatos, 
1978). We cannot see the world specie aeternitatis, for there is no God’s eye view of things to 
which we have access. In addition, since we are dealing with educational theories, and hence 
practical theories, we must be aware that no matter how logical or well reasoned they are, they 
can never obtain with the same certainty as scientific theories, which not only describe and 
explain things, they also predict with accuracy what will occur in the future when tested and 
validated. Theories of education, practical theories, do not function in this manner. For practical 
theories “do not set out primarily to describe the world or to predict its future, but to tell us what 
we ought to be doing in it” (Moore, 1979, p. 11).      
neighborhood, and linguistic environments (Moore, 1979, p. 14). In addition to 
explicating the fundamental forms of knowledge underlying the theory in question, using 
touchstone educators would also search out potential inconsistencies in the theories, work 
to identify the their principle of focus, and search for points of similarity and overlap.  
The quest for epistemological justification for our competing theories begins 
when “T1 is in competition with T2” and “one or more of the claims of T1 is contrary to 
claim(s) of T2. For this situation to obtain, T1 and T2 must be addressed to the solution of 
at least one common problem” (Walker & Evers, 1984, p. 221).  In order to decide which 
of the two reading theories is best suited for the curriculum, we begin by stating that both 
reading theories attempt to address the concern of how students learn through reading 
instruction, along with the concomitant concern of whether students learn more 
effectively through the limited ‘teacher-student’ model of education (a knowledge-
centered view of education) or within the open model of social groups (a student-centered 
view of education). With the goal of comparing, contrasting, and ultimately assessing the 
validity and potential effectiveness of each, we are concerned with the manner in which 
knowledge is experienced, assimilated, and cognized by the reader. As stated, touchstone 
in education incorporates logic, semantics, and mathematics, and also, when necessary, 
the findings from a variety of fields and disciplines such as educational sociology and 
educational psychology. Touchstone is necessary, first and foremost, “for the clear and 
rationally ordered statement of rival theories,” if the comparison and assessment is to 
have weight and validity (Ibid, p. 224).  
For the sake of brevity, I limit my analysis to relating the effectiveness of each 
reading theory to the issue of “early literacy” in education by employing the 
interpretation of early literacy found in the analysis of Neuman (2010), which focuses on 
the critique of the definition of literacy as established by the 2008 National Early Literacy 
Panel (USA).7 Literacy, as defined by the panel, is narrow and tends to overlook the 
important aspects of both background (archive) knowledge and meaning-making (as 
knowledge-construction) in their link with code-based skills in developing literacy in the 
young reader. The author, against the findings of NELP, argues that  
 
code-based skills do not sufficiently account for early literacy development. 
Rather content-rich setting in which skills are learned through meaningful activity 
help children acquire the broad array of knowledge, skills, and dispositions that 
build foundation for literacy learning (Neuman, 2010, p. 301). 
 
Neuman’s study indicates that code-based skills can be more effectively acquired in 
actual instances where the student is actively immersed in the reading process itself, i.e., 
these skills need not be taught, and further, should not be taught in isolation and then later 
applied in situations where students read for content and comprehension. Neuman moves 
away from the model for literacy grounded in the “old fashioned notion that learning to 
                                                 
7  For the most part, the panel’s report reduces early literacy to “code-oriented” intervention 
techniques for teaching reading. “The bulk of the studies panel reports – more than 40% of them 
– focused on code based interventions: NELP discovered that alphabet knowledge (code), 
phonological awareness (code), phonological memory (code), writing one’s one name (code), and 
rapid naming of letters (code), were the strongest predictors of later measures of literacy” (p. 
301). 
read precedes reading to learn” (p. 301). Neuman does not deny the importance of the 
cognitive mechanisms involved in reading, for “code-related skills, the essential 
alphabetical principles that make up our language, are a crucial components in learning to 
read” (Ibid, p. 303). However, she goes on to add that although these skills are necessary, 
they are certainly not sufficient in and of themselves, and must be accompanied by a 
large store of archival knowledge that emerges through a process of knowledge-
construction. Neuman’s claims are grounded in arguments related to the empirical 
observation that children desire to know and learn in the company of others, and whether 
it’s about cars, rockets, dinosaurs, or jungle animals, it is the goal of knowledge driving 
“their abilities to come to school to learn about literacy among many other skills, not the 
ability to ‘rapidly name a sequence of reporting random sets of pictures and objects” (p. 
303). Her findings indicate that the most effective way to ensure literacy is to adopt a 
philosophy stressing an approach where code and content learning occur simultaneously 
occurring within the activity of reading.   
We must consider that Rumelhart’s theory incorporates a detailed formal analysis 
for processing information, which focuses on the “internal mental mechanism of reading, 
and […] depicts these mechanisms by analyzing and compartmentalizing them and 
explaining how they work together” (Cunningham and Fitzgerald, 1996, p. 51). This 
‘theoretical’ model for reading is grounded in the concerns of cognitive psychology, 
wherein the reading process is outlined as beginning in the initial stages of symbol 
divination as graphic information is decoded and assimilated. This information is then 
distributed to the various message centers of the brain. The reader then actively works 
through the centers of information in order to form “hypothesis that are continually 
generated, modified, confirmed, and discarded, until the most probable hypotheses are 
determined to be the correct one” (Ibid, p. 51). In light of what has been presented, even 
if young readers were the focus of educators, this theory provides a formal view of the 
cognitive processes of reading that, while potentially valuable from the perspective of the 
early acquisition of reading skills, is dogmatically opposed to the type of constructive 
meaning-making required to authentically increase the child’s background knowledge. 
This store, or archive, of knowledge cannot simply be given over to children through a 
process of rote transfer, a form of learning this reading model endorses – recall 
knowledge in this model is pre-procedural in nature. Rather, in order for children to 
legitimately acquire this store of knowledge, which is a form of procedural knowledge, 
they require “time to actively play with ideas, accumulate experience, ask questions, and 
connect new learning with what they already know” (Neuman, 2010, p. 303).   
 This exposes two potential problem with Rumelhart’s reading model, as it fails to 
acknowledge either (1) the notion of knowledge-construction, or meaning-making, which 
we relate to a learner-centered view of education, or (2) the influence of the student’s 
social surroundings on the processes of literacy and the experience of reading, which we 
relate to knowledge as a social construction. For this reason, Rosenblatt’s theoretical 
model, which is grounded in a contextual approach to reading, offers a different 
understanding of the processes of student learning. Neuman argues that code related 
interventions coexist with content learning, and there is in fact a reciprocity present to 
their relationship. It is possible to judge Rosenblatt’s reading model superior to that of 
Rumelhart’s model, for it is a more effective and holistic way for inspiring student 
literacy through reading instruction, as it leads to the improvement of both the student’s 
general knowledge and her vocabulary as it simultaneously sharpens her decoding skills 
For as opposed to the concern with code-related skills, such as print referencing, at a 
remove from the context of authentic reading, it returns “book reading to its original 
purpose: learning about ideas and the words that convey them” (Neuman, 2010, 303). In 
the following passage relating to the practical activity of reading, grounded in a model 
similar to that of Rosenblatt, Neuman describes the interdependence of the two aspects of 
early literacy in praxis:  
 
We read to little 4-year-old Abigail a story about kings and queens. Instead of 
going on to a new topic, over the next few days we read more stories about kings 
and queens, both fiction and non-fiction. Over the course of the readings, Abigail 
learns how they lived, what they did, and what problems they had to solve. Her 
questions become more pointed; her curiosity is piqued as she develops a growing 
knowledge base on the topic. We develop some activities; perhaps some play 
settings that allow Abigail and her friends to use what they are learning, 
constructing new meanings through play. And chances are good that Abigail will 
increase not only her general knowledge but the vocabulary she uses to express 
her ideas (Ibid, p. 303). 
  
 This reading model also has important implications that transcend the stages of 
early reading acquisition and relate to advanced notions of ‘literacy,’ e.g., reading 
comprehension and the higher-level interpretation of literature in terms of meaning-
making, which is consistent with the type of communal dialogue that unfolds in 
institutions of higher-learning through hermeneutic interpretation. As the foregoing 
epistemological analysis indicates, Rosenblatt’s theoretical model stresses that reading, 
and indeed all instances of learning, transpires in a non-dualistic manner as dialogue 
within a context where there exists an active reciprocity between educator, student, and 
text, a context within which both teacher and student contribute to a communal 
environment of learning. We might imagine the contemporary implications of this model 
for reading if we relate it to the philosophy of social construction in curriculum and the 
notion of teaching for ‘social justice.’  
For example, the notion of ‘text’ might be employed to all manner of social-
cultural-political institutions and organizations as signifying the context, or locus, of a 
highly complex interplay of signs and codes for the construction of meaning, which 
includes an understanding of the relation of ‘power sources’ to the construction of 
knowledge (Foucault, 1980). Since this relates directly to the notion of knowledge-
construction as a social phenomenon, our analysis would include examining the work of 
those who have studied the relationship between social structures and literacy, wherein 
the social environment plays a crucial role in reading acquisition and the development of 
literacy, which includes the classroom, familial settings, and the community at large. It is 
possible to link the epistemological and axiological implications of Rosenblatt’s reading 
model to the notion of ‘critical literacy’ that we find in the writings of Arnowitz and 
Giroux (1985): 
 
[C]ritical literacy is linked to notions of self and social empowerment as well as to 
the process of democratization. In the most general sense, critical literacy means 
helping students, teachers, and others learn how to read the world and their lives 
critically and relatedly; it means developing deeper understandings of how 
knowledge gets produced, sustained, and legitimated; and most importantly, it 
points to forms of social action and collective struggle (p. 132). 
 
Conclusion 
 
It has been my goal to understand the influence of epistemology on our educational 
practices and student development, and in the process to argue that philosophy holds the 
potential to make an active and viable contribution to the study of education. By 
exploring the conception of knowledge in the curriculum, I have elucidated the 
connection between our foundational and fundamental conceptions about knowledge and 
its relationship to influencing our pedagogy and methods of assessing student progress. In 
addition I have included a brief discussion on the verification of our epistemological 
claims as related to the justification of competing educational theories. As stated at the 
outset, by engaging in this study, my goal was to show the influence of a systematic 
understanding of epistemology on education, and in addition, to demonstrate the 
importance of philosophy in the process of coming to understand the systematic and 
formal inter-workings of our programs of education. 
Ensuring that our culture continues to develop and evolve through the personal 
growth and the contributions of our students, calls for a project that must include a 
systematic understanding of knowledge and its impact on the curriculum. By taking into 
consideration these two forms of knowledge, the various criteria for justification, and the 
unique ways in which humans assimilate knowledge, it is possible to maximize the 
student’s potential for self-initiated development, when we plan such our reading 
instruction in ways that are consistent with the philosophical understanding gleaned 
through our analyses of epistemological issues. In short, students will benefit from 
educators approaching this issued in a critical manner. The attempt to understand the 
influence of epistemology on pedagogy and student development is but one way in which 
philosophy holds the potential to make a legitimate contribution to educational studies.  
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